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Abstract 
The objective of our paper is to provide a comprehensive overview of possible influences that the key players of 
corporate governance – board of directors, executive management, auditor and shareholders, might have on financial 
institutions’ path to success. We consider our goal important due to the increasing number of governance failures and 
corporate scandals affecting banking environment, which gave rise to the present financial crisis and made from 
corporate governance a subject of controversy.  
Unlike prior research studies which were focused on similar goals - to test possible influences of corporate 
governance on firms’ value, our paper provides a particular approach on a specific business field, the banking one 
that was little explored on this topic before. Moreover, our research provides a more comprehensive approach of 
corporate governance impact over banks’ road to success, considering not just performances reached, but also the 
strategies followed, ensuring by thus originality, which adds a plus value to our study.  
The paper proceeds as it follows. Firstly, we briefly review prior literature concerning possible relationships between 
main “actors” of corporate governance and firms’ value often expressed by their performance. We continue our study 
by developing particular hypotheses related to corporate governance influences over financial institution’s efficiency 
in case of Romanian banking system. After explaining in detail the data collection method and empirical analysis 
design, we test our hypotheses using information from sampled banks’ websites. Finally, we provide our research 
findings and discuss their implications, closely related to previous studies focused on the same goal.
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility 7th International 
Strategic Management Conference 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate governance has become one of the most debated subjects, especially in banking 
environment, as a consequence of the latest financial crisis that spread all over the world. In fact, this 
crisis made from corporate governance a controversial economic concept, bringing it as well to the 
attention of media and academic environment, and thereby becoming the most challenging topic of 
worldwide research. Many studies focused on corporate governance mechanism analyzed its components 
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closely related to successes reached or unavoidable failures, concluding that weak corporate governance 
system negatively affect firm value, while strong governance mechanism improves efficiency. 
Basing on this background, our paper aims to provide a comprehensive overview of possible influences 
that key players of corporate governance – board of directors, executive management and shareholders, 
might have on financial institutions’ “road” to success, revealing as well how various features of these 
“actors” are affecting Romanian banking system. Unlike prior research studies which were focused on 
similar goals - to test possible influences of corporate governance on firms’ value, our paper provides a 
particular approach on a specific business field, the banking one that was little explored on this topic 
before. Moreover, our research provides a more comprehensive approach of corporate governance impact 
over banks’ road to success, considering not just performances reached, but also the strategies followed, 
ensuring by thus originality, which is adding value to our study.  
The paper proceeds as it follows. Firstly, we briefly review prior literature concerning possible 
relationships between main “actors” of corporate governance and firms’ value often expressed by their 
performance. We continue our study by developing particular hypotheses related to corporate governance 
influences over financial institution’s efficiency in case of Romania. After explaining in detail the data 
collection method and empirical analysis design, we test our hypotheses using information from sampled 
banks’ websites and we developed two models revealing significant influences of corporate governance 
features over strategies followed and performances reached in Romanian banking system. Finally, we 
provide our research findings and discuss their implications, closely related to previous studies focused on 
the same goal.  
2. Literature review 
The prior international literature provides various surveys on corporate governance impact over firms’ 
value, by testing the influences that features of the board of directors, executive management or 
shareholders, such as their size, independence, foreign character or gender diversity, might have on their 
efficiency.  
Their findings often appeared to be opposite and, consequently, we can not talk yet about a “unique” 
model of good corporate governance. Thus, even if it has been widely agreed that a small board of 
directors made of maximum seven or eight people can help improve performance [1], [2], on the other 
hand, there are controversial opinions as regards its independence, some authors considering outside 
directors as “a good thing” [3], while others identifying a little or no association between board 
independent structure and performance [4], [5], [6], [7]. Moreover, there are studies conducted over time 
in various countries (France, Germany, UK, Switzerland, Malaysia, Hong Kong), whose findings 
generally suggest that leadership structure showed any relation with firm performances [8], [9], [10], [11]. 
Prior literature focused on assessing “size” as a feature of corporate governance show a fairly clear 
negative relationship between board size and entity value, many authors arguing that large boards are less 
effective and difficult to coordinate [12], [13], [14], [15], [16]. 
 “Independence” is another important feature of corporate governance that has been widely studied at 
international level along time. Many empirical papers aimed to analyze the effect of board structure, 
assessed through members’ independence on firm value, show positive influences in this respect [17], 
[18], [19], [20], [21], arguing that managers will be more effectively monitor, thus reducing opportunistic 
managerial behaviors and expropriation of firm resources. But there are also opinions that stated 
otherwise, therefore associating “outside” members of the board with weak corporate governance that 
might negatively affect performances and the flow of information between board of directors and 
management [22], [23], [24], [25]. 
Similar associations have been made along time between top executive management independence and 
firm value. This time, the most evidences show that chief executive officer’s duality negatively affects 
performances [26], [27], sometimes in an indirect way, by decreasing the ability to effectively monitor 
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investments or the reliability of accounting information [28], [29], [30]. However, there are researchers 
appreciating that CEO’s duality might enhance financial performances [31]. 
Opposite findings have been reached as regards “foreign character”, too, which was often analyzed as 
regards ownership. Thus, there have been identified positive influences over business values from foreign 
ownership in developing countries [32], [33], [34], [35] and negative influences in developed economies 
[36], [37].  
“Gender diversity” is a relatively new topic of interest in corporate governance literature and it is 
mainly due to the latest financial scandals, starting in 2001 with the case of Enron, when it became a 
subject of interest for those researchers focused on the board of directors [38], [39], [40], [41], their 
results often revealing a growing concern about the lack of heterogeneity in the composition of boards. 
This feature lead to controversial findings, too, while female directors performed better and companies’ 
financial results were higher, senior leaders proved to have a positive influence over the quality of 
reported earnings [42], unlike female management [43]. 
The above mentioned findings are just a few examples of controversies related to corporate 
governance, which allow us agreeing with some authors’ statement, who appreciate that its “size, 
composition and structure can be good or bad, depending on what you are looking for” [44] or, moreover, 
who consider that there is an optimal corporate governance structure “which varies across firms and over 
time” [45]. 
Corporate governance in banking environment has proved to play a different role due to its 
particularities related to liquidity function, opacity of the balance sheet and complexity of activities run or 
stakeholders’ variety. All these aspects increased the researches interest in measuring corporate 
governance influences over banks’ value [32], [33], [46], [47], [48], thereby offering us an outlook for 
research. 
3. Hypotheses development 
Thus, basing on previous findings on corporate governance influences on firms’ value in general and 
considering the conclusions already reached on banking environment, we formulate our first hypotheses 
related to Romanian banking system: 
H1: Financial institutions’ performances are influenced by various features of corporate 
governance. 
Moreover, banks proved to be different than other entities due to the complexity that characterizes 
their activities made of a combination of traditional banking operations (interest income based operations, 
such as taking deposits and issuing loans) and non-traditional ones (commissions and fee-based 
operations, such as securities trading and underwriting).  
A study conducted in this respect [49] proved that the increasing variety of banking transactions has 
opened up new opportunities for passing from relatively low-risk relationship banking activities to more 
risky trading activities. Thus, these different strategies created new challenges in bank corporate 
governance [50], being also a source of inspiration for our study and therefore allowing us formulate the 
second hypotheses: 
H2: Financial institutions’ strategies (traditional/non-traditional) are influenced by various features 
of corporate governance. 
4. Empirical design and results 
4.1. Sample selection and variable measurement 
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For achieving our goal, we selected a sample of financial institutions that are running their activities in 
our country (80%), depending on the availability of information needed on their websites, which was the 
main source of information for our research.  
For performing the analysis we considered three corporate governance key-players: board of directors, 
executive management and shareholders. For each of them we selected a series of characteristics, which
will stand as independent variables, in order to assess their influence on banks’ performances and 
strategies (dependent variables). In this respect, we considered various features, part of them being tested 
before, such as foreign character [51], [52], [53], gender [42]. [43], size [12], [13], [15], [16] and 
independence [54], [31], [6].  
For testing our first hypotheses, we had to decide which independent variables to use as a measure of 
performance. One of the most frequent proxy used in prior literature was Tobin’s Q (the market value of 
equity plus the market value of debt divided by the replacement cost of all assets), some researchers using 
various modified forms of Tobins’s Q indicator. Because it was difficult to get the required information 
relating to the market value of sampled banks, since these are not all listed and such information are not 
usually disclosed in their financial reports, we decided to use ROA (Return on Assets) and ROE (Return 
on Equity) as proxies for banks performances, these variables being often used in prior related research, 
too. 
For testing our second hypotheses, we appreciated the nature of strategy followed, by making 
difference between the traditional one, mainly made of interest incomes and the non-classical one, 
focused on riskier activities, such those with securities.    
The independent variables used for performing the empirical analysis are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Independent variable description 
Corporate governance “actor” Variables Description 
provenience BP percentage of foreign directors 
gender BG number of male members 
size BS number of members 
board of directors  
independence BI outside members 
provenience MP percentage of foreign directors 
gender MG number of male members 
size MS number of directors 
executive management
independence MI CEO’s status 
provenience SP percentage of foreign ownership 
origin SO EU majority ownership 
structure SS presence of individual ownership 
shareholders  
concentration SC percentage in equity 
The dependent variables used for performing the empirical analysis are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Dependent variable description 
Dependent variables  Variables description 
Return on 
Assets
Perform.ROA ratio between net profit and total assetsPerformance
Return on 
Equity
Perform.ROE ratio between net profit and equity
Strategy Strateg ratio of net interest / non-interest income to 
total assets
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The research methodology used, appropriate for such empirical studies, is based on econometric 
analysis using SPSS software. Thus, firstly, we established the correlations between dependent and 
independent variables selected, testing as well their significance. Then, we developed two functions, 
using linear regression, which reflect each considered factor’ s influence over banks’ performances and 
strategies. 
4.2. Data analysis and hypotheses test results 
For performing the correlation analysis, we calculated Pearson coefficient that is usually used for 
measuring the strength of linear dependence between two variables, giving a value between “1”, that 
describes the perfect direct relationship and “-1”, that reveals an indirect one, “0” value meaning that 
there is no linear correlation between variables. 
Table 3 shows the values of Pearson correlations among all considered variables: 
Table 3. The correlation matrix between variables 
Independent Board of directors Executive management Shareholders 
Dependent BP BG BS BI MP MG MS MI SP SS SO SC 
Strateg .624** .742** .167 .700** .593** .700** -.177 .624** .521** -.632** .562** .078 
Perform.ROA .461* .287 -.263 .250 .593** .850** -.063 .472* .674** -.474* .399* .280 
Perform.ROE .482* .491** .090 .491** .535** .661** -.138 .542** .526** -.478* .356 .271 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
By analyzing the values of Pearson’s coefficient we reached to the following conclusions: 
- board of directors features, like gender, independence and provenience,  proved to have the strongest 
influence over strategies (0.742; 0.700 respectively 0.624), being significant with a high probability 
of 99% (Sig. <0,01), while performances expressed by ROA are influenced just by provenience, in a 
medium extent (0.461) and with a smaller probability of just 95% (Sig. <0,05). There have been also 
identified correlations of medium intensity between the same board characteristics already mentioned 
above and the other measure of performance – ROE. Board size proved to be the only feature that did 
not have a significant influence over banks performances and strategy, thus being excluded for the 
rest of the analysis. 
- executive management, which was analyzed from the same perspectives as the board of directors, 
proved to have similar influences over strategy and performance expressed by ROE. As regards 
ROA, correlation coefficients reveal significant influences with a high probability of 99% (Sig. 
<0,01) from gender (0.850) and provenience features (0.593), while management independence have 
a medium influence over ROA (0.472), being significant with a probability of 95% (Sig. <0,05). 
Management size was excluded from the rest of the performed analysis, basing on the same criteria 
of insignificant influences over dependent variables, as in case of board of directors. 
- shareholders provenience is the only independent variable that influenced both banking strategies 
(0.521) and performances (0.674 for ROA and 0.526 for ROE), being significant with a high 
probability of 99% (Sig. <0,01) in all cases. Medium intensity correlations, with the same 
significance probability, have been also identified between strategy and shareholders’ structure 
(0.632), respectively shareholders’ origin (0.562). The only independent variable that did not have 
any influence over banking strategies and performances was shareholders concentration, thus being 
excluded for the rest of the analysis, too. 
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Basing on Pearson correlation coefficient values, we can conclude that performances reached by 
Romanian banks, expressed by ROA, depended the most on management and shareholders features 
(especially gender and provenience), being influenced by board provenience, management independence, 
shareholders structure and origin, too, but in a less extent and with a lower significance. 
As regards performances expressed by ROE, significant correlations have been identified especially 
with management features, but also with shareholders provenience, board independence and gender. 
Board provenience and shareholders structure were the only variables that have a lower significant 
influence. 
Consequently, considering the wide range of correlations between variables presented above, we 
appreciate our first hypotheses (H1) as being accepted. Thus, we can assert that financial institutions’ 
performances are influenced by various features of corporate governance. 
For testing our second hypotheses, we analyzed the correlations identified between all independent 
variables and the nature of strategy followed by banks. Pearson correlation coefficient values allow us 
reaching to the overall conclusion that strategies have been influenced by corporate governance feature to 
a grater extent than performances. The strongest influences, highly significant, came from board of 
directors features (gender, independence and provenience), followed by management (with the same 
features as the board) and shareholders (structure, origin and provenience), too. 
Accordingly, we can accept our second hypotheses (H2), too, thereby asserting that financial 
institutions’ strategies are influenced by various features of corporate governance. 
4.3. Model development 
Considering the purpose of our research – to find the most appropriate answer to our question “Do 
corporate governance “actors”’ features affect banks’ value?” – we appreciate as the best alternative to 
develop a model expressing all significant influences of the board, executive management and 
shareholders over strategies followed and performances reached by banks. 
In this respect, we used multiple regression as the method of analysis and Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) as the method of estimation. For developing our models, we start for the general economic model 
used in prior literature focused on similar goals: 
Y= α + βi ∗ Fit + eit  (1) 
where, Y is the dependent variable; α is constant, βi is the coefficient of the explanatory variable, Fit is 
the explanatory variable (corporate governance features in our case) and eit is the error term (assumed to 
have zero mean and to be independent across time period). 
For developing our model, firstly we had to test the significance of the relationship between dependent 
variables and all independent variables, where proved to exist a correlation, according to Pearson 
coefficient values. 
Using linear regression and both “enter” and “stepwise” methods, we selected for our model just those 
independent variables that proved to explain better the influences over the dependent ones, considering R 
square coefficient values. Also, the analysis of variance performed, using Anova test, helped us 
measuring the strength of each relationship established. 
The first model developed reveals the influences of corporate governance features over performances, 
expressed separately by ROA (Model 1a) and ROE (Model 2b).  
Both models have a high significance (at .000 levels of ROA/ROE). The first model is more complex 
than the second one, containing four independent variables and being explained in 81,8% of cases, unlike 
the second model, which has a lower relevance, being explained in just 49,9% of cases.  
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As regards the direction of relationships identified, there are positive influences of management gender 
and shareholders provenience over performance expressed by ROA, while board provenience and 
shareholders structure have a negative impact, as the signs of coefficients reveal. In case of performance 
measured by ROE, both board independence and management gender have a positive influence.  
Values presented in Table 4 show the results of the regression analysis performed in this respect. 
Table 4. Regression analysis for “Performance Model” 
Model 1a∗) Model 1b∗)
Perform.ROA Perform.ROEVariables 
Coeff. Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Variables  
Coeff. Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -.590 .007   (Constant) -.151 .476   
BP .215 .014 .375 2.664 BI .238 .100 .840 1.190 
MG .643 .000 .379 2.640 MG .488 .002 .840 1.190 
SP .268 .005 .300 3.330      
SS -.227 .066 .669 1.496      
F value: 24.744 
F significance: .000 
R Square: .818 
Adjusted R Square: .785 
F value: 11.939 
F significance: .000 
R Square: .499 
Adjusted R Square: .457 
∗)
 this model is significant for p-value<0.1
The last model developed was aimed to express the relationship between corporate governance 
features and strategies followed by banks, the results of the regression analysis performed in this respect 
being presented in Table 5. 
Table 5. Regression analysis for “Strategy Model” 
Model 2a∗) Model 2b∗∗)
Strateg StrategVariables 
Coeff. Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Variables  
Coeff. Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -.760 .000   (Constant) -.792 .000   
BI .251 .050 .576 1.735 BI .314 .017 .627 1.594 
MG .343 .005 .694 1.440 MG .409 .001 .777 1.287 
BG .370 .005 .602 1.662 BG .381 .006 .603 1.658 
MI .207 .081 .680 1.471      
F value: 24.098 
F significance: .000 
R Square: .814 
Adjusted R Square: .780 
F value: 28.129 
F significance: .000 
R Square: .786 
Adjusted R Square: .758 
∗)
 this model is significant for p-value<0.1 
∗∗)
 this model is significant for p-value<0.05 
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As it can be seen, we developed two models, too, but with different significance and different variables 
considered. The first model has the same significance as the previous ones expressing the relationship 
between corporate governance and performances. It explains 81,4% of cases, all variables (gender and 
independence of board and executive management) having a positive impact on bank strategies. The 
second model developed has a higher rate of significance (95%), explaining 78,6% of cases, which is a 
quite good rate. 
In conclusion, the results of our empirical analysis, expressed by the models developed, provide a 
comprehensive answer to our research question “Do corporate governance “actors”’ features affect banks’ 
value?”, allowing us as well to discuss upon the influences identified over strategies followed and 
performances reached in Romanian banking system. 
Table 6. Corporate governance influences over performances and strategies - regression models   
Models Significance 
Perform.ROA α + β1∗BP + β2∗MG + β3∗SP + β4∗SS p-value < 0.1 
Perform ROE α + β1∗BI + β2∗MG p-value < 0.1 
Strateg α + β1∗BI + β2∗BG + β3∗MG + β4∗MI p-value < 0.1 
Strateg α + β1∗BI + β2∗BG + β3∗MG p-value < 0.05 
where values for coefficients α and βi are presented in Table 4 and Table 5 for each model  
5. Findings and conclusions 
Many empirical analysis performed at international level so far were focused on possible relationships 
between corporate governance mechanism and firm performance measures, but the outcomes of these 
studies are mixed. On the other hand, banking system was little explored on this topic before, providing 
us the chance to enrich the research literature with an empirical study aimed to reveal how corporate 
governance actors’ features affected financial institutions value in case of Romanian banking system. 
The results of the correlations tests reveal positive relationships between banks’ traditional strategies 
and performances, and foreign corporate governance (board of directors, executive management and 
shareholders), made majority by male members, where CEO duality avoidance is ensured, the board of 
directors is entirely independent and the majority of shareholders are coming from European Union 
members states. Our results are consistent with some general prior literature findings as regards the 
foreign character of ownership [36], [37], the independence of board’s members [17], [18], [19],  [20], 
[21], CEO’s duality [26], [27] or leadership structure gender diversity [42]. 
The only negative correlation appeared to be between shareholders structure and banks value, 
revealing that those banks that still have individuals within its ownership performed lower.   
Also, there were found factors such as shareholders concentration, board and management size, which 
proved to have no influence in this respect, and therefore they have been excluded from the linear 
regression function created for emphasizing the intensity and the direction of influence of corporate 
governance features over strategies and performances in case of Romanian banking system.  
Finally, the regression models developed provides a comprehensive and more relevant image of the 
Romanian banking system, therefore offering us the opportunity to make comparisons with prior related 
studies focused on the same topic and area of research. Thus, our banking system encounters both 
similarities and differences, one example in this respect being the Portuguese banking system, which 
appears to be different than ours, the results of [53], who tested among other factors the influence of 
foreign equity and board membership over interest / non-interest margin, revealing that there is a positive 
relationship between foreign shareholders and non-traditional activities. On the other hand, some of our 
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findings are consistent with prior research results on banking system. Thus, we reached to the conclusion 
that chief executive officer’s duality weakens banks’ value, in accordance with other authors’ findings 
which suggest that cost efficiency and return on assets are lower for Chairman-CEO banks [6]. Also, the 
foreign character of ownership has a positive influence over performances, closer to other authors finding 
[32], [33], [34], which concluded that foreign owned banks are more efficient than domestic private 
banks, by reaching higher net interest margins and higher net profitability. 
 Being aware of our study’s limitations, coming from the sample of banks, the limited number of 
factors and the fact that only one year data were considered for analysis, we are appreciating these as a 
challenge that give us outlooks for future research. 
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